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  4/24/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 250 1/12  VOL. 250, DECEMBER 4, 1995629 Galay vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 120132. December 4, 1995. * CRISANTA GALAY, ET AL., petitioners, vs.  COURT OF APPEALS and VIRGINIA WONG, represented by her Administrator, ATTY. REYNALDO B. HERNANDEZ,respondents. Compromise Agreements; Judgments; Words and Phrases;Compromise, Defined; A judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order toterminate a litigation already instituted.  —A compromise is abilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208of the Code, as “a contract whereby the parties by makingreciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to onealready commenced.” Thus, a judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise agreement entered into by theparties in which they make reciprocal concessions in order toterminate a litigation already instituted. Same; Same; Where it appears that nowhere in the judgmentdid it appear, nor can it be inferred therefrom, that the court’sdisposition took into account any agreement or concessions madeby the parties, the judgment is not based on a compromiseagreement but a decision rendered entirely on the merits.  —In thepresent suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgmentbased on a compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decisionrendered entirely on the merits. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion,the dispositive portion of the decision is very explicit inexclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment.Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom thatrespondent court’s disposition took into account any agreement orconcessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgmenton a compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of thedecision allegedly embodying the compromise agreement revealedthat the same are nothing but admissions made by the partiesintended to clarify the applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact  4/24/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 250 2/12 the said admissions are expressly laid out in Section 28(c)(8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of anycompromise agreement as the same are already provided in thelaw.  _____________  *  SECOND DIVISION. 630 630SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Galay vs. Court of Appeals Squatting; Statutes; R.A. 7279; Although private individualsare not prohibited from taking part in the relocation of squatters,there is nothing in the law either that compels them to undertakesuch task on a mandatory basis.  —Anent petitioners’ claim thatprivate respondent must also share the responsibility of relocating petitioners, the same is also without any basis. Theaforecited provision is very explicit that the task of relocating thehomeless and the underprivileged shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned and the National Housing Authority with the assistance of the other government agencies. Although private individuals are not prohibited from taking partin the relocation, there is nothing in the law either that compelsthem to undertake such task on a mandatory basis, otherwise,such obligation should have been included in the provision, eitherexpressly or impliedly. Thus, petitioners attempt to furtherburden private respondent with their relocation is unwarranted. Same; Social Justice; The policy of social justice is notintended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it iscommitted by the underprivileged—at best it may mitigate the penalty but it certainly will not condone the offense.  —Equallyunpersuasive is petitioners’ plea for social justice. In previouscases, this Court has emphasized that “never is it justified toprefer the poor simply because they are poor, or to reject the richsimply because they are rich, for justice must always be served,for poor and rich alike, according to the mandate of the law.” Inthe same vein, it has been held that “the policy of social justice isnot intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it iscommitted by the underprivileged. At best it may mitigate thepenalty but it certainly will not condone the offense. Compassionfor the poor is an imperative of every humane society but onlywhen the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeservedprivilege.”  4/24/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 250 3/12 Same; Same; Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider that very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right.  —In closing, we find it fittingto advert to the following pronouncements made in the case of Martires vs. Court of Appeals: “While we sympathize with themillions of our people who are unable to afford the basic necessityof shelter, let alone the comforts of a decent home, this sympathycannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal offense. Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it considerthat very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoymentof a right. This is what the petitioner wants us to grant him. Butwe cannot heed his unjust plea because the rule of law ringslouder in our ears.” 631  VOL. 250, DECEMBER 4, 1995631 Galay vs. Court of Appeals The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.   Public Attorney’s Office  for petitioners.  Reynaldo B. Hernandez  for private respondent.FRANCISCO, J.: In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorersections of the communities in urban areas, the legislatureenacted Republic Act No. 7279 otherwise known as the“Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992,” envisionedto be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting inthe metropolis. Nevertheless, the courts continue to beswamped with cases arising from disputes in the properimplementation of the aforementioned legislation,particularly on matters involving the eviction, demolitionand resettlement of squatters. The present suit is amongsuch cases.The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks toannul the decision of respondent Court of Appeals datedSeptember 20, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 33761 entitled“Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla and Virginia Wong, represented by her Administrator, Atty.Reynaldo B. Hernandez.” Petitioners claim that theassailed decision was based on an unauthorizedcompromise agreement to which they never consented norhad any knowledge thereof.Material hereto are the following antecedents:Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented byher Administrator and Attorney-in-fact, Reynaldo B.  4/24/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 250 4/12 Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 38-5830)against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have beenillegally occupying private respondents’ 405 square meterlot located in Quezon City which is covered by TransferCertificate of Title No. 51589 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Although petitioners do not claim ownership over thesubject premises, they however disputed privaterespondents’ claim of ownership and alleged that they havebeen in possession of the property in question since 1972 byvirtue of the tolerance and 631 632 632SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED Galay vs. Court of Appeals permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez. On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by theMetropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 38,ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the disputedpremises. 1 Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,Branch 83, the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Courtwas affirmed in toto . 2 Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of  Appeals and filed a petition for review, but the petition wasdismissed outright for failure to state the material dates toshow that the petition was filed on time and for not beingaccompanied by certified true copies of the disputeddecision. 3 No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence,the judgment became final. This prompted privaterespondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan TrialCourt in its order dated March 25, 1994, 4  taking intoaccount that the judgment has already become final andexecutory.In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgmentand their consequent eviction, petitioners filed a complaintfor Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and TemporaryRestraining Order before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 216, 5  alleging that herein privaterespondent must first comply with the mandatoryrequirements of Section 28(c) of RA 7279 regarding evictionand demolition by court order.In its order dated April 5, 1994, 6  the lower court deniedthe prayer for the issuance of a restraining order as the act
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